Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 19

Issue 2

Article 6

1931

Case Comments
Kentucky Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Kentucky Law Journal (1931) "Case Comments," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 19: Iss. 2, Article 6.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol19/iss2/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

CASE COMMENTS
CoqsTrruloxNA LAW-SEARCH AND SExzunu--Owner of the premises
asked the sheriff to search a vacant tenant house for whiskey. The
defendant was taken into custody by the sheriff for operating a still
therein. The defendant claims the evidence was incompetent because
it was obtained by an illegal search, the sheriff having no warrant.
Held, evidence competent. The constitutional provision against unreasonable searches applies only to the rightful owners of property or
persons rightfully in possession. Carter v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 695,
28 S. W. (2d) 976.
Section 10 of the Kentucky constitution reads as follows: "The
people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions,
from unreasonable search and seizures; and no warrant shall issue to
search any place, or seize any person or thing, without describing them
as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation." The fourth amendment to the constitution of the United
States is in substance the same.
The problem here is, who is entitled to raise the question of unreasonable search and seizure with respect to property, In the wording of the principal case, it interprets the constitution to mean that
protection extends to either the owner or the person rightfully in
possession. No stranger who neither owns nor possesses the property
can find protection. Lakes v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 266, 254 S. W.
908. Nor can a bare licensee by acquiescence complain of a search
without a warrant. Duke v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 365, 256 S. W.
725. The same general rule is found In Anderson v. Commonwealth,
204 Ky. 486, 264 S. W. 1087. In view of the foregoing cases, it is all
the more reasonable that a trespasser should not find protection behind the screen of constitutional rights.
Other states have interpreted their constitutional provisions similarly. Lee v. City of Oxford, 134 Miss. 647, 99 So. 507; State v. Fen7ey,
309 Mo. 520, 275 S. W. 36; Jenkins v. State, 198 Tex. Cr. R. 184, 299 S.
W. 642.
The case of Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 364, 275 S. W.
878, is confusing. There the defendant had leased the premises
searched. The sheriff had a warrant to search at the time but he lost
it. The court said the question of whether or not the warrant was of
sufficient description to include the defendant's leased premises need
not be determined, since "the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is directed to the protecting of the
defendant's premises and possessions from such searches, and he cannot
object to a wrongful search of another's premises or possessions."
Under the rule of the principal case this case is wrong, since the defendant was the owner of the premises even though he did not have the
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possession. The rule reads, either ownership or possession. The case
of Anderson v. Commonwealth, sutpra cited in the Buchanan case does
not stand for the proposition laid down there.
The District Court in U. B. v. Wexler, 4 Fed. (2d) 391, held that
if the house or premises of a co-defendant are unreasonably searched
without a proper warrant, he alone whose house has been unreasonably
or illegally searched will be heard to complain. The evidence secured
thereby is admissible against all other defendants. In Coon v. U. B., 36
Fed. (2d) 164, the court said, "The legality of the search of premises
can be raised only by the owner, lessee or lawful occupant of the
premises searched; that is, by the person whose rights have been
invaded." See also Lusco v. U. S., 287 Fed. 69; U. H. v. Kaplan, 286
Fed. 963. The Federal rule is consonant with the principal case, but
is flatly opposed to the Buchanan holdings. And the latter case is
even more surprising in view of the broad interpretation the Kentucky
courts have put upon this section of the constitution. Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860; Morse v. Commonwealth, 204
Ky. 672, 265 S. W. 37. The liberal interpretation is no doubt the better
one. It is to be remembered that the purpose of this constitutional provision is to protect the indefeasible right of personal liberty, personal
security, and private property.
J. C. B.
CmmiNAL LAw-TRIA,---SrnT
G AsmE VERDIOT AS AGAINST THE
WEIGHT OF TH= EviDENcE-Bourne was convicted of manslaughter and
sentenced to fifteen years in prison for the killing of Hugh Wayne.
From this conviction, he appealed on the ground that the verdict Is
flagrantly against the weight of the evidence. The preponderance of
the evidence was to the effect that accused shot deceased in self-defense,
but the appellate court held the verdict good and stated the rule that
if there is any evidence upon which the jury could base its conclusion
of guilt, the verdict will not be set aside as contrary to the weight
of the evidence unless there was an error of law prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the defendant. Bourne v. Commonwealth, 234
Ky. 842, 29 S. W. 2nd 561.
Defendant's testimony was to the effect that deceased, during a
friendly conversation with defendant, became very angry over a fence
dividing their places; that deceased jumped up and caught him by
the arm with one hand and, cursing him violently, reached for his
hip with the other hand. Defendant knew that deceased had a bad
reputation for peace and good order, and he had heard that deceased
carried a gun all the time and that he had killed a man. This statement was corroborated more or less fully by five other witnesses, so
the preponderance of the evidence was against the verdict, and favored
a plea of self-defense.
However, the court said the verdict should not be disturbed under
the rule laid down. Defendant killed deceased. Deceased was not
armed, and he had one shot in the back, with all the shots ranging
downward. In addition to these facts, the record before the appellate
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court was not complete, because of the many demonstrations and
Illustrations made in the trial but not contained in the record. So,
it seems that the court was justified in holding that there was evidence upon which the jury could base its verdict, and, finding no
error of law, that the veridct should not be disturbed.
A few cases will show that the rule applied has long been the law
in Kentucky, which follows the general rule. It is elementary and
granted that questions of fact are to be decided by the jury, and where
the evidence reasonably supports the verdict, it will stand, and the
judgment will be affirmed. Holland v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 44,
261 S. W. 851. Another case says that where, in a criminal case, there
is any evidence to support a finding or verdict, the judgment will not
be reversed on appeal. Elliott v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 222, 266
S. W. 162. Another case held that where there are facts sufficient to
take the case to the jury, the appellate court will not disturb the verdict on the facts. Wison v. Commonwealth, 181 Ky. 370, 205 S. W.
391. Of course, the above rules apply only to actions at law in which
there Is found no prejudicial error of law. They apply alike in civil
and criminal actions.
A sound conclusion from the cases appears to be that even though
the verdict seems in the opinion of the judge, contrary to the weight
of the evidence, if the jury had evidence from which it could reasonably find Its verdict, it will not be disturbed unless there has been
a prejudicial error of law.
It seems that this is a sound rule in. criminal as well as civil
actions. According to our system of criminal law, the interests of
one accused of a crime are amply protected, and the jury trial in
criminal cases is held inviolate. Once the jury has returned its verdict
under proper instructions as to the law applicable to the facts, if there
Is any proper evidence before the jury upon which it could reasonably
G. B. F.
find such a verdict, it should stand undisturbed.
Evm c-ExPEaT TEsToNY-BLASTMnG.-The plaintiff had on
his farm a large three-story brick residence, which was injured by the
blasting operations of the defendant, who herein seeks to reverse a
judgment against him in the Mercer County Court. The defendant
relies on four grounds, (of which we are interested in only the first,)
for the reversal of this judgment. The first is that the court erred in the
admission of evidence; the alleged error consisting in allowing the
plaintiff to testify that these cuts could have been made without using
such large quantities of explosives, when he had not shown himself
to be an expert in such matters. In disposing of this contention, the
appellate court said: "But it does not take an expert to know these
things. Those things are known to the ordinary man," and thus held
such admission was no error. Brooks-Calloway Co. v. CarroU, 235 Ky.
41, 29 S. W. 2nd, 592.
In the first place, a knowledge of the properties of dynamite and
other explosives is not, as a matter of fact, a part of the general com-
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prehension of the average man. Unless one lives in a mining or similar
community, opportunity for a familiarity with explosives almost never
occurs. The members of the Court of Appeals themselves are undoubtedly ignorant of such matters unless by the merest accident.
This must be especially true of the inhabitants of Mercer County, who
are largely farmers and stocK-growers. Even one who has lived in a
mining community probably does not know how much dynamite Is
required to move a given amount of rock a certain distance. To acquire such knowledge, it is necessary to either study the subject or
actually use the explosive, neither of which the average man does.
Questions of this nature are always the subject of expert testimony.
A peculiar knowledge is requisite to the answer.
Secondly, the testimony of the plaintiff was nothing but his own
mere opinion. He did not detail facts; he described no occurrence;
he set forth no knowledge of his own. He merely stated his opinion
as to the effect of a given set of circumstances, the typical place for an
expert opinion. This an ordinary witness cannot do. "Whatever is
presented to the senses of the witness and of which he receives therefore direct knowledge, he may state. This is strictly matter of fact.
What he has seen or heard of felt, he knows in the sense in which the
law requires knowledge on the part of the witness testifying. What he
thinks in respect to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue,
is a matter of opinion and he cannot state it. It is for him to put before the jury the facts as he perceived them by his senses, and for the
jury to form an opinion concerning the facts in proof of which the
evidence was offered." McKelvey on Evidence, (3rd Ed.) p. 259, wherein
are cited some of the innumerable cases sustaining this proposition.
A witness must testify as to facts and not to the opinion or conclusion
he himself adduced from these facts. That is the exclusive function
of the expert witness on matters subject to expert testimony. The
ordinary witness must confine himself to personal observations. The
witness in this case, whom the court called an ordinary witness, was
given a purely imaginary set of facts, and asked the probable result,
I. e., what in his opinion the probable result would be. In effect, the
witness was asked, "Given a certain amount of rock to be moved, how
much dynamite would it take to move it?" The witness did not state
what had happened, but gave his prophetic opinion as to what might
happen, or what would happen. This the law does not permit him
to give in evidence. Such hypothetical questions, formulated for the
particular purpose of eliciting an opinion can properly be asked only
of an expert or skilled witness, and the answer, necessarily being a
mere opinion, ought not be admitted. "Since hypothetical presentation
Is proper and necessary only when the witness has not had actual
observation, does it follow that to anyone at all, who has not had
actual observation, the premises may be presented hypothetically, and
his conclusion asked upon them? By the opinion rule, the tribunal will
not listen to conclusions or opinions of persons who possess no more
skill than the tribunal itself in drawing inferences from the premises,
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1. e., persons of only ordinary skill. The hypothetical form of presentation is proper, therefore, for those witnesses only who bring to the
consideration of the particular premises in hand a more than ordinary
skill." Wigmore on Evidence (2nd Ed.) Sec. 679. Ragland v. State,
125 Ala. 12, 27 So. 983; Dunham's Appeal, 27 Conn. 197; Dolbeen's
Estate, 149 Cal. 227, 86 Pac. 695; Chicago andT W. I R. . Co. v. Heidenreich, 254 Ill. 231, 98 N. E. 657. The following language from the case
of Lawrence v. Haul Lumber Co., 171 Ala. 300, 55 So. 111, is peculiarly
appropriate to this case: "If the witness was not an expert" (as in the
instant case) "and no expert knowledge was required for his conclusions" (as the court in the present case decided), "manifestly his
opinion could be of no service to the jury since they were in possession
of all the facts upon which his conclusion rested, and were capable of
drawing a correct conclusion for themselves." The Kentucky courts
heretofore have followed the general rule. "Witnesses must state facts
and not their conclusions." Colcer v. Coker, 216 Ky., 669. It seems to
us for these reasons that the lower court erred in the admission of
this evidence, and that the Court of Appeals should have reversed the
H. T. W.
decision.
EVIDENcE-PAROL TEsTONY To VAry AGnEEmENT.-A creditor,
after signing a creditor's agreement not to sue or molest defendant
company, brings an action to cancel his own obligation to the agreement on the ground that his signature was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation to the effect that all other creditors, except two, whose
claims amounted to $8L00, had signed the agreement, whereas, claims
amounting to over Q3,000.00 were outstanding at the time agreement
was entered into.
The agreement contained no stipulation that all creditors must
sign it before it became effective but did not say that only such number
would be asked to sign as should prove satisfactory to the trustees
selected by the creditors.
Held that the representation that no other claims were outstanding
was material and, being false, warranted a cancellation of the contract.
Goodin et al. v. Page, 235 K. 54, 29 S. W. 2d 581.
Defendant's attempt to secure a reversal of this holding was on
the ground that the agreement did not require the signature of all
creditors and that the attack on it was not for fraud or mutual mistake, but only on the ground that plaintiff's signature was obtained by
false representation, and that parol evidence could not be admitted to
vary the terms of a written contract.
The decisi6n indicates very clearly that the evidence admitted to
prove the false representation was not for the purpose of varying the
terms of the contract but merely to avoid the entire contract-that
when the misrepresentation is in the inducement, parol evidence is
admissible to attack the whole instrument.
Kentucky is on sure ground in this matter; it is noted in Provident Savings Insurance Co. v. Shearer, 151 Ky. 298, 153 S. W. 938, that
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the court holds parol evidence admissible to show fraud, mistake, and
misrepresentation of a written contract but specifically rejects it if
the purpose be to vary the terms thereof; again in Smith & Nixon Co.
v. Morgan, 152 Ky. 430, 153 S. W. 749, the court says that a written
contract may be attacked as a whole by parol evidence which shows
that it was obtained by fraud, or by misrepresentation, or by mutual
mistake. In the case of a widow testifying as to agreements made
previous to or contemporaneous with her entering into an ante-nuptial
contract, it was held in Gaines v. Gains' Adm., 163 Ky. 260, 173 S. W.
774, that all such agreements must be considered as merged into the
written instrument, and that evidence concerning them as a whole
cannot be admitted unless there was fraud or misrepresentation in the
execution of the contract.
Williston on "Contracts" at p. 2668, section 1500, states that rescission of a written contract is allowable for any kind of material misrepresentation, even though innocently accomplished, since it would
be unjust to allow one party to retain the fruits of a bargain induced
by misrepresentation.
The principle is universally accepted that a contract may be
rescinded if the statement inducing the procurement of the contract
is false and relied upon even though no fraud be present. Trimble v.
Reid, 97 Ky. 713, 31 S. W. 861, 17 Ky. Law Reporter 494.
The Supreme Court of the U. S. in Hartshorn v. Day, 19 Howard
111, held that parol evidence is admissible to show that imposition has
been practiced upon a party in procuring his signature.
Inference that the whole instrument must be attacked is very
clear; none of its terms may be varied or cancelled, and new terms
H.H.B.
cannot be added.
EVIDENc--PHYsICAL

EXAMNA

ON IN TH PRESENCE OF THE JURY.-

Plaintiff sued for damages for injury to his back and spine, incurred
while in defendant's employment. During the trial, in the presence of
the jury, the court allowed, over the objection of the defendant, a
doctor to run his fingers up and down the spinal column of the plaintiff, and during this examination, the plaintiff cried out In pain at
certain times, and later objected to standing alone and unassisted in
the court room. Verdict for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals, assigning as error, among others, the court's allowing this physical examination in the presence of the jury. Held error; judgment reversed and
cause remanded for a new trial. Such an examination can show nothing of value pertaining to the actual injury of the plaintiff, and can
only excite the jury and increase the damages given through the pity
aroused for the suffering plaintiff. Meyer v. Johnson et a7, 30 S. W.
2nd 641., Mo.
The rule as to exhibitions of injuries to juries seems to be well
marked out and firmly founded on good reasons. It allows exhibitions
of amputated members and even of the amputated portions themselves
to show the actual extent and character of the maiming as the very
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best way to show the jury the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. The
only limitation is where the exhibition would necessitate such an
indecency as would have no place in the judicial procedure. 1. Thompson On Trials See. 858. Thompson further says that if it is best for
justice between party and party, the court may order an inspection,
but in any event it is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to
order or allow it. And further, "the objection that such an exhibition
has a tendency unduly to excite the sympathies of the jurors is not
tenable." All this as to exhibitions, which are perfectly permissible
in most courts by the weight of authority; the difficulty is encountered
when the trial court permits a crippled plaintiff to hobble across the
court room in a pitiable manner to show the jury the use he can make
of his crutches and the stump remaining to him. There is no doubt but
that such a spectacle will cause the jurors to pity the victim, and it
is very likely that this pity will be reflected in the amount of the
damages returned in case the jury finds for the plaintiff. In the case
of Willis v. City of Browning, 161 Mo. Appeals 461, 143 S. W. 516, cited
in the principal case, the plaintiff was allowed to exhibit her injured
ankle to the jury, which was held proper and afterwards her lawyer
said to her, "show the jury the best that you can do." A demonstration followed, which was held to be reversible error, the court saying:
"The defendant suffers enough unavoidable disadvantages in a trial
for personal Injuries. Should a sensitive wound be touched in order
that the jury might hear the plaintiff scream? The maimed, the
widow, and the orphan draw strongly enough on the hearts of the
jurymen without any affirmative effort to arouse sympathy. Further,
there is no restraint on the opportunity for simulated evidence."
In Osborne v. City of Detroit, 32 Fed. 36. the plaintiff's physician
was permitted to stick a pin into the plaintiff's right cheek, arm, side,
thigh, leg, and ankle to show to the jury that the entire right side
of her body was paralyzed. This was held to be an examination only,
and not a demonstration. This case was later reversed, but not on this
point, 135 U. S. 492. This case is cited with approval in Kansas City
Southern v. Clinton, 224 Fed. 896, where the court upheld the trial
court's ruling that it was permissible for the plaintiff to give a practical
illustration of his condition before the jury.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in the case of Madison Coal Corporation v. Altmire, 215 Ky. 283, 284 S. W. 1068, held, however, that it
was error and Improper for the court to allow plaintiff's attorney to
conduct exactly such a physical examination before the jury by pricking plaintiff's body with a needle to show the extent of paralysis suffered by coming in contact with a high tension wire in a coal mine.
There was some doubt in this case though whether or not the paralysis
was caused by the wire or bodily conditions of the plaintiff before
the alleged injury. If the injury had been conclusively proven to be
the result of the contact, and the only purpose was to show the extent
of the disability suffered, it is possible that the court would have ruled
otherwise on this question. The Kentucky Court has previously held
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that it is proper to exhibit injured arms and legs to the jury, saying
that it is a material fact, (the character and extent of the injury)
necessary to determine the amount of damage to award in case the
plaintiff is allowed to recover. Newport News and4 M. V. Ry. Co. v.
Carroll 17 Ky. Law Reporter 374., 31 S. W. 132, and later in the case
of Ford v. Providence Coal Co., 124 Ky. 517, 99 S. W. 609, the only
limitation put upon the rule that it is proper for the plaintiff to exhibit
the injured members to the jury is that no impropriety or indecency
be present in the examination. This case also says that such an
exhibition and examination is the best evidence obtainable of the
character and extent of the injury.
It is believed that there is no substantial conflict in the cases on
this question, which will arise in a very large per cent of personal
injury suits. The debatable ground is encountered when the line,
which divides a legitimate and fair examination or exhibition from
a sympathy-engendering demonstration of ability to walk or move
the injured part, is approached. This distinction is nicely observed in
the Illinois case of Johnson v. Wassonm Coal Co., 173 Iil. App. 414,
where the plaintiff was permitted to display his injured ankle to the
J. H. C.
jury, but was not permitted to move it.
SuR. Y-CoNTAOTon's BOxm-Lm-LABUrY TO MIAT=Amr.-The
principal contracted with the Kentucky State Highway Commission
to construct a bridge, the vital clause of the agreement reading, "That
the party of the second part (contractor) hereby agrees under penalty
expressed in the bond hereunto attached, to furnish and deliver all
materials and do and perform all the work and labor required in the
construction of (certain bridgework)." The principal executed a bond
with defendant surety which read in part, "The condition of this
obligation is such that if said principal shall well and truly keep
and perform all of the terms and conditions of a certain contract
and shall indemnify the said Commonwealth of Kentucky as therein
stipulated, etc." Neither the bond nor the contract contained any
express provision in favor of materialmen. The plaintiff, who had
furnished materials to the principal, rested his case against the surety
on the ground that, since the materialmen could not assert a lien on
public property, "it will be presumed that the bond was intended for
the benefit of laborers and materialmen." The Court of Appeals, unable
to find in the written instruments any provision for the benefit of
materialmen, rendered a decision in favor of the surety, pointing out
the distinction between this case and one where the bond, read In
connection with the contract, creates an obligation in favor of the
materialmen. Standard Oil Co. v. National Surety Co., 234 Ky. 764,
29 S. W. (2d) 29.
This case involves both the rights of a third party who claims to
be a beneficiary and the liability of a surety. While the dogma of
stricti juris has been so modified that an ambiguous clause In a bond
made by a compensated surety will be given the interpretation most
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unfavorable to the surety, the principle that a surety is bound only by
the express terms of his contract still has vitality. Champion Ice Mfg.
etc. v. American Bonding Go., 115 Ky. 863, 75 S. W. 197; American
Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 133, 18 Sup. Ct. 552; Pond Creek CoaZ
Co. v. Citizens Trust & Guaranfy Co., 170 Ky. 601, 186 S. W. 494. However, it seems more reasonable to hold that this rule should not interfere with the use of ordinary tests by which the actual meaning and
intention of contracting parties are primarily determined. American
Bonding Co. v. Pueblo Investment Co., 150 Fed. 17, 80 C. C. A. 97.
Under the Kentucky doctrine that the business of "surety companies" is in all essential particulars that of insurers, it seems that
the contract of surety in such a case should be given the same interpretation as other written contracts. Champion Ice Mfg. etc. v. American Bonding Co., supra.
In the instant case the court said, "We have in Kentucky two
distinct lines of decision in cases of this character. If the bond, when
read in connection with the contract, contains a provision obligating
the contractor to pay for the material . . . it constitutes a provision
for the benefit of . . . and*materialmen, upon which they are entitled to maintain an action directly against the surety. On the other
hand, when the bond is one solely to secure performance of the contract and contains no language from which an express covenant for
the benefit of third parties may be derived, an action thereon by a
stranger to the contract may not be maintained." This view has support in the Kentucky decisions cited by the court. Dayton Lumber
Co. v. New Capitol Hotel, 222 Ky. 29, 299 S. W. 1063; Owens v. Georgia
Life Ins. Co., 165 Ky. 507, 177 S. W. 294.
Other courts have also recognized the rule that a surety is not
liable to a materialman unless the contract or bond, by express terms,
obligates at least the principal to pay for materials and labor. Dunlap
v. Eden, 15 Ind. App. 575, 44 N. E. 560; Electric Appliance Co. v. U. S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 110 Wis. 434, 85 N. W. 648; Gato v. Warrington, 37 Fla. 542, 19 So. 883. Several courts deny the materialmen an
action against the surety even where there is an express provision in
the instruments that the principal will pay for labor and materials.
Jefferson v. Asch, 53 Minn. 446, 55 N. W. 604; Board of Agriculture v.
Dimiclk, 46 Colo. 609, 105 P. 1114.
The contract and bond in the case of Mayes v. Lane, 116 Ky. 566,
76 S. W. 399, were almost identical with the instruments in the present
case, the contractor agreeing to "furnish and deliver all materials."
But the plaintiff in that case was the owner of the building who had
been forced to pay liens to materialmen. The surety tried to evade
liability for these payments by the obligee of the bond on the ground
that there was no express provision in the contract whereby the contractor bound himself to pay for material. The court rightly held that
the obligations of the contractor and the surety included payment for
materials, thus construing "to furnish and deliver" to mean "to pay
for." This case shows that the owner of the building need not stipu-
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late in the contract and bond for payment to materialmen by express
provisions. It therefore follows that where there is an express provision for materialmen it was intended for their benefit, since the owner
is protected otherwise.
The court in the decision under discussion is no doubt correct in
saying that, "before a stranger can avail himself of the exceptional
privilege of suing for the breach of an agreement to which he is not
a party, he must at least show that it was intended for his direct benefit." Some other courts to the contrary, Kentucky has held that a
citizen who has suffered loss to his house by fire through a failure of
the water company to maintain sufficient pressure may recover from
the water company as a beneficiary of the contract whereby the water
company obligated itself with the city as promisee to maintain a certain water pressure. Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water Co., 89
Ky. 340, 12 S. W. 554. In so holding the court interpreted the contract between the city and the company as intended by the city to be
for the benefit of its inhabitants. Thus Kentucky seems to be more
liberal toward a third party beneficiary than some other courts.
The primary consideration is the intent of the promisee in obtaining the contract. In most cases where the contract specificially obligates the builder of public buildings to pay for labor and material it
is apparent that the promisee intended the promise for the benefit of
laborers and materialmen, since liens do not serve their ordinary
function of protecting materialmen. It is only reasonable to assume,
therefore, that where a party to a contract who is exempt from
mechanics' liens desires to protect a third party materialman, he will
do so in such an affirmative manner that it will specificially appear
in the written instruments through which he accomplishes this purpose.
In the present case the court necessarily infers that the clause
"to furnish and deliver all materials" is not tantamount to one which
reads "to pay all claims of materialmen and laborers against the contractor."
C. S.
To Ts-NEGmniNcE--INvrATioN"-LicEsF-Defendant, R. R. Co., for
forty years had allowed the public to use its bridge as a footway. In
constructing a new bridge running parallel to the old bridge, it had
taken up the flooring from the old bridge but subsequently had relald
the flooring, so that the footway could be used, and pedestrians used it
thereafter just as they had used it before interruption caused by temporary removal of flooring. In reconstructing the flooring a guard rail
was left exposed, and at or near such point on the bridge the deceased,
,n his way home in the nighttime with his small son, was struck by
a passing freight train and was instantly killed. No notice prior to
this time had been given by the defendant R. R. Co. to the public that
permission to use the bridge had been withdrawn.
Held: That,
although the deceased was not an invitee in'the technical sense that
one going upon the premises of another for their mutual benefit and
advantage is an invitee, the facts of the case bring it within the class
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of cases' in which the doctrine has been recognized and applied that,
when the owner by his conduct has induced a party to use a private
way in the belief that it is open for the use of the public, the duty is
imposed upon him of maintaining the way in a reasonably safe condition. L. & AT.R. R. Co. v. Snow's Admr., 235 Ky. 211, 30 S. W. (2d)
885.
A licensee is one who is upon the premises of another for his own
benefit or pleasure, and he must take the premises as he finds them.
The licensor is liable only for gross negligence. I U. R. . Co. v.
Eickter, 202 Ill. 556, 67 N. E. 376; Cumberland, etc., Co. v. Martin, 116
Ky. 557, 76 S. W. 394.
An invitee is one who is expressly or impliedly invited upon the
premises of another for the mutual benefit or advantage of both parties,
and the owner of the premises is under a duty to have them in a
reasonably safe condition. D'Amico v. City of Boston, 176 Mass. 599,
58 N. E. 158; Land v. Fitzgerald, 68 N. J. L. 28, 52 Atl. 229.
It is quite clear that, in the instant case, the deceased was not upon
defendant's bridge for the mutual advantage of both parties and so,
as stated in the court's opinion, could not be classed as an invitee.
However, regardless of this technical classification and the relationship existing between the parties, many courts have recognized an
exception in case of a way across lands or structures thereon. If the
owner or occupant has permitted persons generally to use or establish
a way under such circumstances as to induce a belief that, it is public
in character, he owes to persons availing themselves thereof the duty
due to those who come upon premises by invitation. Pomponio v. N.
Y., etc., R. Co., 66 Conn. 528, 34 Atl. 491, 50 A. S. R. 124, 32 L. R. A. 530;
Ohenery v. Fitchburg R. Co., 160 Mass. 211, 35 N. E. 554, 22 L. R. A.
575. As stated in Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, sec. 706:
"Invitations will also be implied from such long acquiescence as reasonably to give rise to the inference that it is invited, but it is not
ordinarily to be inferred from mere passive acquiescence in what would
otherwise be a trespass."
By the weight of authority, where ways have been used by the
public for such length of time that they have come to be regarded as
public ways, the owners of such must take care not to make them
unsafe until proper notice of the change has been given. But this
pirnclple must be distinguished from mere permission to pass over
lands. Vanderholt v. Hendry, 34 N. J. L. 471.
The instant case clearly comes within the recognized exception.
The bridge in question had been used by the public for years with the
acquiescence and consent of the defendant R. R. Co., and it had been
left, due to its changed condition, in an unsafe condition for parties
passing over it in the nighttime. The defendant Co. was negligent in
its duty to the deceased, in not giving notice of the changed condition
of the bridge.
J. K. L.
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TORTS-LIABILITY OF FATHER FOE MINOR SON'S NEGLIGENcE.-Defendant owned an automobile for the general use of the family and which
had been used by his minor son, a boy under sixteen years of age,
for more than a year as transportation to and from school, defendant
acquiescing in the use. While returning from school in this car the
son negligently ran into and injured the plaintiff. In an action to
recover therefor, it was held, that a father who knowingly permits
his minor son to drive his automobile in violation of Laws 1921 (Ex.
Sess.) p. 104, section 27 (i) making it "unlawful for any person under
Sixteen years to operate a motor vehicle on the highways," is liable
for son's negligence. Roarkc v. Stone, - Mo. App. -, 30 S. W. (2d)
647.
As a general rule a father is not liable for the torts of his minor
son. Loehr v. Abell, 174 Mich. 590, 140 N. W. 926. However under
two principal lines of cases a father may be liable for such torts,
namely, under the "Strict Agency Doctrine" and under the "Family
Purpose Doctrine." Both rules are based upon an agency relationship,
for paternity alone will not render a parent liable at common law for
the torts of his son, nor will the mere ownership of the car make
him so. Denison v. Norton, 228 Fed. 401, 142 C. C. A. 631. The strict
agency doctrine holds a father liable as principal for the acts of his
minor son done in the furtherance of his father's business. If the
son commits a tort while acting within the general scope of authority
from the father, or in carrying out some enterprise for which he was
commissioned, the father may be liable even though he had no knowledge of the specific conduct in question. Where a father provides a
car to give his family recreation, the use of such car is within the
scope of the father's business. Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386, 144 S. W.
52. But if the act of the son is not done in the furtherance of his
father's business but in the performance of some design of his own,
the father is not liable. Smithz v. Jordan, 211 Mass. 269, 97 N. R. 760.
Nor is a father liable, under the strict agency rule, because he gave his
minor son permission to use the' car. In order to recover, the plaintiff must show that the son acted, as his father's agent and was at the
time of the accident engaged in his father's business. Dennis v. Glynn,
262 Mass. 233, 159 N. E. 516.
The family purpose doctrine, which is adhered to in Kentucky,
is stated thus, "The family purpose doctrine is founded on the relationship of principal and agent; the theory being that if one maintains an automobile or other vehicle for the use, pleasure, and convenience of the members of his family, and it is being used by them
for that purpose when an accident occurs, the one so using the
machine will be deemed the agent of the owner and to have been
operating the car under the owner's authority, which may be express
or implied." Steele v. Age's Adm'x, 233 Ky. 714, 26 S. W. (2d) 563.
Missouri once followed the family purpose doctrine. Daily v. Maxwell,
152 Mo. App. 415, 133 S. W. 351. In that case the father gave his son
permission to use the fanfily automobile and an accident occurred
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through the latter's negligence. Held, father is liable when he furnished his son an auto for his own pleasure, or to run errands, such
as doing personal shopping or going to school. The court said that
It was as much the father's business to furnish his son amusement as
it was to support and educate him. This doctrine is inapplicable in
a case where a thirteen year old minor surreptitiously takes the family car without the father's consent and against his express orders,
because liability of the father is predicated upon agency and this
relation did not exist here. Sale v. .Adkins, 206 Ky. 224, 267 S. W. 223.
It is doubtful whether the family purpose doctrine obtains in
Missouri since the case of Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1, 200 S. W. 286,
cited with approval In the instant case. There, after an exhaustive
review of the authorities, the court held, "The mere ownership of an
automobile purchased by a father for the use and pleasure of himself
and family does not render himself liable in damages to a third person
for injuries sustained thereby, through the negligence of his minor son
while operating the same on a public highway in furtherance of his
own business or pleasure; and the fact that he had his father's special
or general permission to use the car is wholly immaterial." In view
of the Hogan decision, supra, defendant can be liable in the principal
case only under an interpretation of the statute, for the facts negatived the existence of a strict agency relationship between defendant
and the minor son. The statul made it unlawful for a minor under
sixteen to drive on the highways, but the court holds it is negligence
on the defendant's part to permit a person deemed incompetent under
the law to drive, saying, "If the statute. . . . is to have any effect
whatever, the father who knowingly permits such violation of the
.
law, and whose negligence in so doing makes it possible for the child
to cause an injury, must be held liable on account of such negligent
L. B. R.
act."
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CHANCE-HUmANrIAIAN RuLu.-The plaintiff with his face turned to
the south stepped from the curb on to the tracks of the defendant's
street car line, and there was struck and injured by a car of defendant
coming from the north. The Court based its decision on the humanitarian rule, and said, "The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to
show facts that would render defendant liable on that theory. To do
this he must have shown that the motorman on this street car did, or
should have discovered the plaintiff was going into a position where.
he would be struck unless the car were stopped, or plaintiff warned in
a manner, and in time to have stopped him before he was struck."
MeGuire v. Springfield Traction Co., 30 S. W. (2nd), (Mo.), 794.
In the early law, contributory negligence was an absolute defense.
The case of Daies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, was the first to limit this
doctrine by applying the last clear chance rule.
"If the power to avert the danger existed in both parties until a
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certain instant, and in neither afterward, contributory negligence would
be, with one exception, a good defense." 24 Yale Law Journal 330.
Thus the Court in the principal case implies that defendant would
not be liable if, after due warning, the plaintiff continued to walk on
to the tracks. Ignorance of the danger amounts to an inability to
avert it. The last clear chance, if any, to avoid the injury is in defendant.
In such a situation, where defendant alone has the last clear
chance, all courts would agree that the defendant would be liable if
he had knowledge of the plaintiff's danger and failed to use ordinary
care to avert it. Here, however, the courts part company. By the
weight of authority actual knowledge of the plaintiff's danger is required to subject the defendant to liability. Waterman v. Visalia
Electric Railway Company, 137 Pac. (Cal.) 1096; Iowa Central Railway
Co. v. Walker, 203 Fed. 685; St. Louis H. W. Railway Company v.
Cochran, 77 Ark. 398; Wolf v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 147 N. W.
(Iowa) 1901; Zitnik v. Union Pacific Railway Company, 136 N. W.
(Neb.) 995. Many courts adopt the humanitarian rule and impose
liability if the defendant had such an opportunity as would have enabled an ordinarily reasonable man to discover the plaintiff's danger
in time to avert the danger. Brown v. Kansas Elec. Utility Co., 203
Pac. (Kan.) 907; Hornbuckle v. McCarty, 243 S. W. (Mo.) 327; Nicol
v. The Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 128 Pac. (Wash.) 628; Ray v.
Aberdeen R. R. Co., (N. C.) 53 S. E., 622; Kinney v. St. Louis & S. R.
R. Co., 133 Pac. (Okla.) 180. Kentucky apparently accepts the humanitarian rule although there is some confusion in the cases. Ross v.
Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 202 Ky. 828; L. & N. Rwy. Co. v.
Lowell, 118 Ky. 260; Doll v. Louisville Rwy. Co., 138 Ky. 486; 1. C. R.
R. Co. v. Pierce, 175 Ky. 488.
The courts which enforce the humanitarian rule must necessarily
hold that the defendant has a legal duty to keep a reasonable lookout
for persons who may, by their own negligence, have placed themselves
in dangerous situations. The occurence of such a situation may reasonably be anticipated; it happens every day. Therefore, it is difficult
to see why a defendant should not be held to the same duty of exercising reasonable care to prevent harm in this type of situation, as he
would be where the plaintiff has not by his own negligence created the
condition which led to the injury. The operator of a dangerous machine
has, in a certain sense, a privilege which should carry with it a greater
amount of regard for the safety of others where the operation of the
machine subjects others, in their ordinary conduct, to greater dangers.
W. H. D.

